This paper offers what we hope is a constructive contribution to the debate about whether legal scholarship is (in)sufficiently tethered to the real world. To the extent there is a disconnect, we believe neither scholars nor the real world of governance are necessarily at fault. Instead, the disconnect stems from a failure to forge connections between theoretical constructs in the academic literature and their applicability to real world conditions. In part, this article is an effort to make such connections through close attention to context in regulatory design.
In an insightful recent article, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, Professor David Freeman Engstrom offers a conceptual framework for reorienting the literature on regulatory enforcement by shifting the focus from a choice between public and private enforcement to analysis of how best to coordinate multiple, overlapping, and interdependent public and private enforcers by vesting in federal agencies "gatekeeping authority" over private enforcement lawsuits. Professor Engstrom discusses theoretical concerns about allowing private actors to bring enforcement cases, and the challenges present in designing welfare-maximizing gatekeeping regimes. Professor Engstrom suggests design options for rationalizing public and private enforcement lawsuits through a public "gatekeeping" scheme that range from empowering agencies to be "extremely interventionist" gatekeepers to restricting them to a much more limited role in shaping private enforcement efforts.
Our article evaluates and builds on Professor Engstrom's important effort to rationalize government and private enforcement of regulatory norms by considering his effort in the context of challenges facing government enforcers in the real world, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in particular. We suggest that agencies such as EPA confront at least five design challenges in developing pragmatic enforcement strategies: the inter-related character of different components of the regulatory process; the hybrid character of contemporary governance efforts; the importance of confronting "reality" in the form of past performance and future challenges and opportunities; the dynamic character of contemporary governance and responses to it; and the salience of possible design changes, which suggests the need to prioritize design improvements. Our view is that pursuing sensible regulatory design, including mechanisms of the sort Professor Engstrom proposes, requires a sophisticated understanding of the regulatory landscape and that our conceptual framework provides a useful typology for developing such an understanding. In short, our article attempts a synthesis of Professor Engstrom's valuable insights about the value of optimizing regulatory enforcement initiatives with our own conception of the manner in which the regulatory state operates in order to provide a contextually-based, pragmatic framework for optimizing regulatory design to promote compliance with regulatory norms.
Introduction
The search for optimal regulatory design is a long-standing one with no clear end in sight. A recent entry in the legal academic literature, Professor David Freeman Engstrom's Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 1 refers to the scholarly debate surrounding optimal regulatory design while focusing primarily on the "institutional design challenge" raised by regulatory enforcement.
2 More specifically, Professor Engstrom calls for a reorientation of the literature from focusing on a choice between public and private enforcement to instead focusing on how best to coordinate multiple, overlapping, and interdependent public and private enforcers by vesting in federal agencies "gatekeeping authority" over private enforcement lawsuits. 3 Acknowledging the importance of context in regulatory design, 4 Professor Engstrom discusses theoretical concerns about allowing private actors to bring enforcement cases, such as overzealousness, challenges in coordination between private and public enforcers, and risks to legislative fidelity. 5 He also addresses the challenges that "bureaucratic behavioral pathologies" such as possible agency capture, agency self-aggrandizement, agencies' predilections for overly cautious behavior, and the influence of careerist incentives of agency personal present in designing gatekeeping regimes that will prove to be welfare-maximizing. 6 Professor Engstrom suggests a minimum of five design dimensions for rationalizing public and private enforcement lawsuits through establishment of a public "gatekeeping" scheme to set parameters for private enforcement, ranging from empowering agencies to be "extremely interventionist" gatekeepers to playing a much more limited role in shaping private enforcement efforts. 7 This Essay evaluates and builds on Professor Engstrom's important theoretical effort to rationalize government and private enforcement of regulatory norms by considering his effort in the context of challenges facing government enforcers in the real world. 8 4 Id. at __ [ms at 26] (noting, for example, that "an important theme . . . is that optimal gatekeeper design is likely to be highly contextual and grounded in the realities of a given regulatory regime." He also notes that "any assessment of the institutional competence and capacity of agencies to perform gatekeeper tasks will necessarily be comparative. . . . The question is whether agencies can . . . make better judgments [of competing modes of enforcement in a complex regulatory regime] . . . or do so more quickly or cheaply, than other institutional actors." Id. at 31. 5 Id. at ___ [ms at 10-17]. 6 Id. at .___ [ms at 39-41] 7 As he puts it, the typology is "designed to be a useful tool, as regulatory designers who desire relatively greater or lesser agency control over private litigation efforts can simply move up or down the taxonomic ladder." Id. at 26. 8 This paper offers what we hope is a constructive contribution to the debate about whether legal scholarship is (in)sufficiently tethered to the real world by attempting a synthesis of Professor Engstrom's valuable theoretical insights about the value of optimizing regulatory enforcement initiatives with our own conception of the manner in which the regulatory state operates. Our goal is to provide a contextually-based, pragmatic framework for optimizing regulatory design to promote compliance with regulatory norms. For differing views about the value of legal scholarship in terms of the resolution of real-world challenges, see, e.g., Harry T. Second, efforts to achieve optimal regulatory design should be mindful of the hybrid character of contemporary governance. Governance is much more than simply the actions of government actors, as Engstrom's analysis of the interaction of public and private enforcement reflects. Again, however, the range of actors is broader than agency and private enforcers, and governance often benefits (or suffers) from the actions of these multiple stakeholders. 13 As Environmental Law Institute President John C. Cruden has put it, most of those in Cruden's generation "in the environmental world grew up on public law." 14 As a result, it is especially important in the search for optimal regulatory design not only to acknowledge the reality, but also to assess both the promise and perils of different variations of hybrid governance (or, as Professor Engstrom characterizes it, "the pluralistic regulatory landscape"). 15 Engstrom also refers to the "complex ecologies of enforcement" within which multiple public and private enforcers operate and with which they interact. 16 As others have amply demonstrated, these "complex ecologies" extend beyond ex post enforcement actions by either public or private actors. 17 One key insight from this central feature of contemporary governance is that efforts to
The search for optimal regulatory design should consider informal controls as well and the relationship between regulatory efforts and other efforts to induce desirable environmental behavior. . Engstrom identifies some of the perils of reliance on private enforcement, as have others. See, e.g., Grabosky, supra, at 119 (noting concerns about private regulatory failure, the potential for private voices to be ignored, lack of accountability, and private overzealousness when acting in a regulatory capacity). As Grabosky colorfully puts it, the sword of citizen participation is two-edged. One would not wish to see the advent of wiki witch hunts. 
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A third, different type of contextual feature that is particularly relevant to the question of optimal design of regulatory enforcement structures, and of agency authority to engage in gatekeeping of private enforcement initiatives, is what we term the "reality check" contextual feature. In revisiting regulatory design it is critical to assess the agency's (here EPA's) actual performance in conducting enforcement, the challenges the agency faces, and opportunities to improve performance by altering regulatory features or practices.
The degree of dynamism is the fourth feature of regulation that we suggest regulatory designers should consider. This is not a feature that receives much attention in Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, but we believe it deserves "front-and-center" status. Optimal regulatory design requires an understanding of the extent to which key features of regulation are likely to be static or dynamic over time. This feature differs from the third feature in that it focuses not on whether existing regulatory practices have worked as anticipated even if the environment in which those practices occur has remained static, but on whether the environment itself has shifted in ways that affect regulatory goals. For example, changes in agency personnel and financial resources, improvements in monitoring technology, and the capacity of regulated parties and NGOs to participate in regulatory implementation are among a litany of factors that affect EPA's capacity for effective governance.
19 EPA is relying heavily on new monitoring tools and data management capabilities to address compliance challenges, as we discuss below. 20 Thus, another contextual feature highlighted in this Essay as an indispensable component of regulatory design is awareness of the likelihood that capabilities and interests of different key actors throughout the entire regulatory enterprise will change over time.
of state, self-regulatory, and third-party activity. Grabosky, supra note __, at 120. See also id. at 118 (noting the "enormous potential for digital technology to enhance the regulatory capacity of ordinary citizens," including the potential for citizens to "assist in labor-intensive investigation of non-compliance"). While the scholarship on such hybrid forms of governance is growing rapidly, Professor Delmas suggests that "the research on environmental governance without government, or between government and other actors, is only just emerging." For discussion of some of the challenges posed by hybrid governance challenges in the law review literature, see David L. Markell 18 For one effort to identify key actors in the implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, see Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 1 (listing federal, state, tribal, and local governments, regulated parties, courts, interest groups, and the general public as relevant stakeholders). 19 There is a rich literature that investigates the ways in which regulated parties are motivated by a variety of factors, including utilitarian considerations as well as cultural norms and habits, and it is worthwhile to consider all of these sources of motivation in regulatory design. See, e.g.,GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note __, at 9, 223; Michael P. A final part of the regulatory design puzzle that we address in this Essay is the importance of salience. In a world of limited resources, it is important to ask the "relative priority" question in designing the regulatory process to improve compliance: how important is it for policy makers to improve the design of a particular part of the regulatory process? Rationalizing integration of private enforcers into the public compliance promotion effort clearly holds promise for improving regulatory compliance, in the environmental context and elsewhere. It is clear, however, that very promising opportunities for transforming regulatory design to improve compliance lie in a broader consideration of the roles that all stakeholders can play during the multiple phases of the regulatory process, including some that precede litigation and related ex post processes. In some circumstances, focusing on agency gatekeeping strategies to influence NGOs' capacity to litigate during the ex post stage of formal enforcement could preclude or undermine pursuit of other opportunities to improve regulatory design to enhance compliance that have more potential to produce desired results. 21 In setting priorities for regulatory re-design this full gamut of possibilities deserves careful attention.
In short, we endorse Professor Engstrom's call to reorient the literature from focusing on a choice between public and private enforcement to assessing how best to integrate these two forms of enforcement.
22 But we believe this reorientation's chances for success will be greatly enhanced by greater awareness of the broader contextual framework described here. Part I's taxonomy of the regulatory process highlights the first two elements of our framework -the need for "integration on steroids" to understand the interconnectedness of different phases of the regulatory process and the promise of engaging a wide array of key actors throughout that process, not simply rationalization of the roles of the public and private enforcers engaged in ex post litigation. Part II focuses on the third and fourth elements -the importance in regulatory design of understanding an agency's track record and how the regulatory landscape may change in the future. Finally, in an effort to crystallize the importance of salience, Part III provides a brief overview of an EPA initiative to re-invent its promotion of compliance with the Clean Water Act (CWA)'s regulatory requirements. The CWA allows for citizen suits, an enforcement mechanism that has been widely used by NGOs and that has generated considerable judicial scrutiny and academic commentary. Yet, the role of private enforcement is not even on EPA's radar screen as a focus of enhancing compliance with CWA obligations, at least based on the guidance documents and other materials EPA has issued to date. Instead, EPA is clearly giving priority attention to a wide range of other design and implementation challenges. EPA thus appears to believe that the most promising efforts to improve the aspects of regulatory design that bear on compliance lie in initiatives other than rationalizing public and private enforcement, creating an interesting contrast between Professor Engstrom's characterization of agency gatekeeping of private enforcement as a central challenge in the modern regulatory state and the 21 While we focus here on the importance of using a wider lens to revisit regulatory design, we do not deny that efforts to assess public and private enforcement are valuable as well. There is a rich literature on such efforts. See, e.g., Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note __, at 661, 671 (noting that the "range of possible combinations of public and private enforcement . . . is substantial and complex," and discussing whether to create private actions, the economic incentives for them, and access rules as among the issues to be addressed); Matthew C. characterized as essential to effective regulation, 30 it is not enough to achieve desired environmental protection policy objectives. The head of EPA's enforcement office recently acknowledged this reality, noting that "[w]hile enforcement is an essential part of EPA's compliance program, it is not realistic to think that enforcement alone will get us to the levels of compliance envisioned by our rules."
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Although it is possible to describe the components of effective regulation in many ways, 32 we think it has at least five key characteristics: clear norms, achievability, verifiability, an optimal mix of sanctions and rewards, and indicia of legitimacy. 33 Among other things, adherence to these characteristics should facilitate regulatory compliance, including achieving a "rationalized" or optimal mix of public and private enforcement. Indeed, understanding these characteristics and the inter-relationships among them in the context of a particular regulatory system is, in our view, critical to designing a rationalized mix of such enforcement. 193, 195 (1994) (listing as components of effective ethics regulation moral resonance, clarity of purposes, non-triviality, practicality, equity, and proportionality). There also is an obvious tension between different regulatory features or objectives. For example, there may be tension between the goal of clarity and simplicity and the capacity to tailor regulation to individual circumstances through the use of differentiated procedural or substantive requirements. 33 One could easily compartmentalize the features of the regulatory process differently, even if one were to agree with the thrust of our effort. For example, our first two categories overlap to some degree, though we think they are sufficiently distinct to deserve separate treatment. Similarly, one could separate the carrot-oriented approach to promoting compliance and the stick-oriented set of options, which we have combined. Additionally, we have not created a separate element to acknowledge the options for self-regulation that play an increasingly important role in regulation today. Further, achieving desired results is obviously one of the indicia of effectiveness. Our typology is simply intended to provide a big picture sense of different key elements of the regulatory process as conventionally understood.
Complaints about indeterminacy are heard from regulated parties as well as members of the public. 34 The government has internalized this message as well, with the head of EPA's enforcement office recently acknowledging that "we should focus on greater simplicity and clarity [in our regulations]. One of the principles we have learned over years of hard experience is that compliance is better when the rules are simple and clear." 35 This message is most obviously salient for the development of regulations, 36 but it is also important in the development of guidance and the exercise of enforcement discretion. 37 This feature of effective regulation has the potential to influence the agency gatekeeper design dimensions that Engstrom identifies. 38 We offer two examples to illustrate the connection. First, the clearer the substantive rules that govern the conduct of regulated entities, the lower the risk that courts, responding to suits by NGOs, will accept novel applications of legal mandates that amount to legislative drift. 39 Under these circumstances, all other things being equal, the need for agencies to exercise veto authority over private enforcement efforts at the retail level should decline. 40 39 See id. at __ [ms at 14-15] (discussing the legislative fidelity critique of private enforcement, which includes the risk that private enforcement will yield legislative drift "as private enforcers drive law enforcement efforts in new and democratically unaccountable directions"). 40 There may be other issues that influence design of gatekeeping structures, such as the desired degree of flexibility concerning remedies.
for private enforcement. A recent Colorado compliance initiative involving hazardous waste rules found that an innovative state initiative to increase understanding of regulatory requirements led to significant improvements in compliance, thereby dramatically reducing the need for enforcement by anyone. 41 These are simply two examples of the many ways in which the clarity of regulatory requirements influences the need for enforcement generally, and the need for government restraints on private enforcement actions in particular.
Second, regulatory designers should consider the implementability of requirements -the extent to which strategies "will work in the real world -rules with compliance built in," as EPA's head of enforcement put it recently. 42 For example, in proposing emission control regulations for oil and gas producers under the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA adopted the strategy of allowing producers simply to inform EPA that they are using air pollution control equipment that EPA has certified rather than testing the equipment itself. EPA's purpose in using this approach is to "make compliance easier and less costly, while improving results . . . ." 43 As students of regulation are well aware, ease of implementation should not always predominate in regulatory design, because concerns that norms are inadequate may be a principal impetus for the development of more stringent environmental standards and, further, more aggressive approaches such as technology-forcing regulation have been used successfully in some contexts. 44 Nevertheless, in developing regulatory approaches policy makers need to be mindful of the challenge they are seeking to address and the workability of the strategies they are considering. There is obviously an overlap between this second attribute and certainty, summarized above. 43 Giles, supra note __, at 23. We do not mean to suggest that self-reporting without any agency oversight would necessarily be an optimal strategy. See, e.g., Schieffelin et al., supra note __ (noting that self-reporting in tandem with agency oversight helped to improve compliance). 44 Technology-forcing regulation has long been an accepted and important tool for achieving environmental protection goals. There have been some notable success stories with what some believed to be aspirational regulations leading to technological developments that facilitated improved performance, in some cases in the face of claims of infeasibility. See RESOURCES & ENV'T 382, 386 (1998) ("In the past, claims that the pollution control technology is impossible to achieve have collapsed when one manufacturer announced that it was able to comply. "); cf. John P. Dwyer, Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995). 45 The balance described in the text is relevant to both desired normative outcomes and strategies adopted to achieve those outcomes. Beyond the types of questions referenced in the text, there are entire literatures devoted to the appropriate content of regulations. For a review of economists' perspectives on regulatory design, see, e.g., Thomas P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An Economic Perspective, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note __, at 43; Giles, supra note __, at 24 (noting that market strategies "can be simple and effective in the right circumstances, reducing costs and providing flexibility for industry while achieving better results"). This feature of regulatory effectiveness is also relevant to the dynamics of agency gatekeeping as a mechanism for rationalizing public and private enforcement. For example, unanticipated regulatory implementation problems may make compliance very costly or not possible at all by applicable regulatory deadlines. Public enforcers might choose to exercise prosecutorial discretion and defer prosecution of known violations, perhaps in return for commitments by regulated entities to sink resources into developing a fix for the implementation problem. Private enforcement may disrupt such negotiations, interfering with commitments that regulated entities might otherwise make to public enforcers. In such circumstances, the arguments in favor of a strong public gatekeeping role for private enforcement actions may be relatively appealing.
A third key feature of effective regulation and of strategies to induce compliance involves what we term "verifiability." This includes the capacity to monitor compliance with regulatory requirements to promote accountability. Monitoring schemes come in various shapes and sizes. The type of monitoring required may depend on availability of government resources, the complexity associated with the monitoring required, the reliability of monitoring equipment, the trustworthiness of regulated parties, and the transparency of the information developed and provided, among others factors. 46 Reflecting the variation in approaches that are possible, one of us was involved many years ago in establishing a statewide strategy that sought to enhance "verifiability" by requiring facilities with especially significant compliance concerns to hire independent third-party monitors whose role was to complement both government inspection efforts and the facility's own compliance efforts. 47 The verifiability of regulatory compliance may affect the optimal design of agency gatekeeping functions. For example, the easier and cheaper it is for private enforcers to acquire information revealing compliance status, the greater the likelihood that the kind of 46 Monitoring can take several forms, such as the requirement that regulated entities file periodic discharge monitoring reports (DMRs), as under the Clean Water Act, see 40 C.F.R. § § 122.2 (defining DMRs), 122.41(l)(4)(i) (requiring filing of such reports), or the obligation for industrial facilities to report annual releases of specified chemicals under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. See U.S. EPA, Toxic Release Inventory Program, http://www2.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program. DMRs are compliance-based, while chemical release forms are not strictly so but can indirectly provide clues about environmental performance generally and compliance in particular. Verifiability tools vary in their degree of transparency. Some commentators have highlighted the importance of broader transparency to the public as a part of verifiability. See Markell, Slack, supra note __, at 8-10 (discussing increases in transparency and public involvement in the environmental regulatory process). EPA's view at least is that "[p]ublic disclosure is [an] underutilized tool: there is powerful evidence that publishing information about company performance drives better behavior, as pressure is applied by customers, neighbors, investors, and insurers." Giles, supra note __, at 24. A 2008 study in Massachusetts found that "drinking water systems required to mail the reports to customers reduced their total violations by 30-44 percent as a result of this new reporting, and reduced the more severe health violations by 40-57 percent. . . . EPA's efforts to make our data more available are only starting to scratch the surface of the ways transparency can improve results." Id. at 25. Further, Giles indicates that transparency may serve a "reminder function": "publishing data on facility performance draws attention to problems and brings senior-level focus to bear on fixing them." Id. In addition, it may bring community pressure to bear on lower performing parties and may alert investors and insurers in ways that provide financial motivation to improve performance. Id. at 25-26. 47 overdeterrence that Engstrom describes in discussing another critique of private enforcement, the "zealousness critique," will occur because the expected return will exceed the low cost of private enforcement. 48 In such circumstances, the result may be a deviation between the private and social value of enforcement.
A fourth attribute of an effective regulatory scheme is its capacity to incentivize regulated parties to achieve optimal levels of compliance. The mix of compliance-inducing tools includes strategies intended to deter undesirable behavior as well as approaches that encourage desired performance. 49 The literature often refers to enforcement schemes that provide general as well as specific deterrence in order to encourage optimal levels of compliance with the law. 50 In addition, the evolving literature in the management area, among others, suggests that various types of "carrots" also have potential to promote compliant behavior. 51 Rationalizing private and public enforcement litigation in order to improve the capacity of enforcement actions to deter noncompliance is one of many strategies that falls within this fourth attribute or feature of effective regulatory design. 52 Our expanded focus suggests the importance of considering private and public enforcement in the context of other available approaches in order to rationalize use of such enforcement. EPA, for example, may want to encourage private enforcement litigation in circumstances in which other forms of inducing compliance, such as reliance on positive incentives, do not yield desired levels of compliance and in which obstacles (such as resource limits) exist to traditional government deterrence-based enforcement. Similarly, EPA may want to be a strict "gatekeeper" if it is concerned that use of private enforcement will undermine national consistency in approaching compliance challenges. For example, private party enforcement efforts that focus on securing particular types of relief with which EPA has concerns in lieu of the types of relief EPA favors may influence the choice 48 See Engstrom, supra note 1, at __ [ms at 10-12]. This critique entails systematic over-expenditure of social resources and costly over-deterrence when private enforcers pursue actions that public enforcers choose not to pursue because the expected cost exceeds the expected social gain. The problems associated with the zealousness critique arise from deviations in assessments by public and private enforcers of the relative costs and value of enforcement. Id. 49 See Lyon, supra note __, at 49-52 (discussing the impacts of various alternative policy instrument choices, such as subsidies and effluent fees). Cf. McGarity, supra note __, at 1207 (arguing that "a carefully selected enforcement initiative may accomplish more than a major assistance-based rulemaking initiative"). 50 52 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 1, at __ [ms at 30] (arguing that "an ideal gatekeeper agency focused on optimal deterrence will join and leverage the enforcement efforts of overmatched private enforcers who will not otherwise fully vindicate the public interest").
of gatekeeping approaches because of not only legislative fidelity, but also coordination issues, 53 to use Engstrom's terms. 54 Finally, we suggest that an important aspect of effective regulation is its capacity to promote legitimacy, which we define to include enhancing confidence by the public and others. 55 We believe that, in pursuing optimal regulatory design in the compliance arena, it is appropriate to ask questions about the effects of different design options on public perceptions. Will a particular regulatory design enhance or diminish public confidence in a regulatory program and the government's ability and willingness to ensure compliance with it? A regulatory scheme that leads to a public perception that government is corrupt, overbearing, or selective may lead to a loss of confidence and trust that undermines effective regulation in many ways, including by exacerbating budget pressures if public support for necessary funding diminishes. 56 Similarly, an enforcement strategy that relies entirely on regulated entities' oversight of their own performance, without verification or transparency of documentation of regulatory compliance, is likely to engender distrust and raise the specter of capture by regulated entities. 57 Given the Colorado's recent case study of an initiative that relies on both self-certification and random agency follow-up inspections reflects that carefully designed self-certification efforts can dramatically improve compliance. See Schieffelin, supra note __ at, 10, 11, 18 (noting that a self-certification program involving small quantity generators under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act "has attained very impressive compliance rate improvements in the SQG universe in Colorado over the last four years," and reporting that the percent of such facilities in 100% compliance with all regulatory requirements increased from 31% in 2008 to 84% in 2011).
polling results showing the American public's loss of confidence in the federal government, 58 we believe that it is appropriate for those interested in regulatory design to consider this feature of effective regulation in considering design options. 59 The legitimacy of a regulatory program and the manner in which an agency implements it may bear on gatekeeping design choices as well. Engstrom discusses "bubble periods," during which regulatory mandates remain unsettled, in part because of the costs of complying with procedures for adoption of regulatory mandates. 60 He posits that vigorous private enforcement may be troublesome during these transitional periods because judicial responses to private enforcement actions may be difficult to override legislatively and enforcement targets may suffer costly adverse judgments notwithstanding subsequent overrides. In such cases, allowing private enforcement might undermine legitimacy in the eyes of the regulated community at a minimum. This effect would support a strong gatekeeping regime. But if agency delay in filling statutory gaps is due not to the costs of regulation but instead to agency disaffection with the statutory regime, private enforcement may help to maintain public confidence in the rule of law. This scenario would seem to favor a weak gatekeeping regime.
We conclude this brief introduction to key features of the regulatory process with three observations. First, a key purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that the features or attributes of regulatory design are interrelated rather than distinct. 61 The need for and viability of ex post enforcement, and the design of public gatekeeping options (Professor Engstrom's focus and a part of the fourth attribute of effective regulatory compliance structures enumerated above), for example, is likely to depend on the clarity of the norms (the first attribute), their implementability (the second attribute), the quality of monitoring and dissemination of compliance information (the third attribute), and the use of other compliance-promotion tools (i.e., other strategies that could be included as part of the 4 th attribute). Thus, it is critical to understand the entire regulatory process not only in designing an overall regulatory program capable of meeting statutory goals, but also in making informed judgments about narrower 58 See e.g., Joy Wilke & Frank Newport, Fewer Americans than Ever Trust Government to Handle Problems, GALLUP POLITICS, Sept. 13, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/164393/fewer-americans-ever-trust-gov-handleproblems.aspx . Some individual agencies, including EPA, tend to poll much higher, however. At the same time that only 19% of respondents in one poll answered that they trust the government to do what is right almost always or most of the time, and only 23% viewed Congress favorably, 62% of respondents viewed EPA favorably. Pew Research Center, Trust in Government Nears Record Low, but Most Federal Agencies Are Viewed Favorably (Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/10-18-13%20Trust%20in%20Govt%20Update.pdf 59 As indicated above, this set of five attributes of effective governance is not intended to be exhaustive or comprehensive. Instead, our intent is to highlight some of the key features of effective regulation. While we did not highlight the need for adequate funding and other resources, as well as stakeholder support, specifically, these also are important to governance's capacity to be effective in advancing objectives. See, e.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note __, at 26 (making this point in the context of adaptive management). 60 Engstrom, supra note 1, at ___ [ms at 16]. 61 The reference to transparency as an attribute that is relevant to legitimacy, for example, reflects the overlap among our categories, as transparency is also often a feature of verifiability. aspects of optimal regulatory design, such as compliance promotion generally or even the appropriate regulatory design of government gatekeeping of private enforcement. 62 Second, hybrid governance, or "pluralistic regulatory governance," to use Professor Engstrom's term, is a critical component of the search for effective regulatory compliance structures. As Professor Engstrom highlights, over time private NGOs have taken on an increasing role in ex post enforcement of the environmental laws, and this expanded role is likely to continue for some time. This form of hybrid governance, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. A wide range of NGOs today plays critical roles that affect each of the five attributes or features of regulatory design we outline above. For example, involvement of key stakeholders in the development of norms can help to produce clarity (characteristic 1 of effective regulation), their engagement is essential in considering feasibility (characteristic 2), and verifiability (characteristic 3) depends on the engagement of regulated parties but also benefits from public involvement. In short, the search for optimal governance benefits from consideration of options for integrating NGOs throughout the regulatory process. 63 Engstrom implicitly highlights the importance of this issue in the search for regulatory design, but it deserves treatment well beyond public gatekeeping of private enforcement. Instead, it is important to consider the implications of hybrid governance across the entire regulatory landscape.
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A final point, which is implicit in our preceding summary of the features of effective regulation and on which we focus in Part III below, is that the possibilities for optimal governance are dynamic, as the capacities of different actors evolve. For example, advances in technology that facilitate better monitoring and data management hold promise for transforming governance in ways that overcome some of the more pressing historic and contemporary challenges. EPA is relying on these new tools heavily as it pursues improved regulatory design to address the compliance challenges it faces. 65 Our purpose in this Part is to support our claim that the search for optimal regulatory design requires an understanding of the entire regulatory process and of the actors who play critical roles throughout that process, whether the goal is optimal regulatory design for a regulatory scheme writ large, or optimal regulatory design of a particular piece of that scheme. We now turn to a brief review of some of the real-world compliance-related challenges and 62 See Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 5 (noting that policy makers continue to wrestle with the challenge of "how to balance punishment and deterrence through litigation with compliance assistance, incentive approaches, self-auditing or correction, and voluntary compliance") 63 The dynamic nature of "new governance" approaches is important to bear in mind, as the predilections of different actors change over time. See, e.g., Grabosky, supra note __, at ___ (suggesting that the increased role of NGOs in governance stems in part from a retreat by government that has created a regulatory vacuum). Grabosky suggests that "regulatory space is contested, and resulting relational interactions between institutions are often complex." Id. at 116. Some favor some degree of orchestration of different actors (Engstrom falls into this camp, as do we), while others "may see a regulatory system characterized by spontaneity as inevitable." Id. at 115-16. 64 Others have highlighted this reality as well and agencies have recognized some of the opportunities. EPA, for example, initiated the "National Report a Violation" website in 2006 in an effort to encourage citizens to report potential environmental violations, part of the "verifiability" characteristic we describe above. Esworthy Professor Engstrom has helpfully expanded the debate about optimal regulatory design of the enforcement function beyond assessments of the appropriateness of litigation reforms by suggesting the relevance of gatekeeping design options. In Part I, focusing on the operation of EPA, we argued that a broader range of regulatory features is relevant to effective regulation, including effective enforcement, and provided examples of how these features are inter-related; in particular, we explained how different features may affect gatekeeping design. In this Part we provide additional context by reviewing EPA's enforcement track record and capacity and explain how they relate to the optimal design of compliance approaches generally, and of gatekeeping approaches in particular.
Evaluating effectiveness in inducing compliance is an extraordinarily difficult task. 66 It is worth being mindful of the old adage about optimists seeing the glass half full and pessimists seeing the same glass as half empty in considering EPA's performance and appraisals of its enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, a wide variety of observers, inside and outside government, have identified significant concerns over EPA efforts to promote compliance. EPA faces substantial barriers in overcoming these challenges, including resource constraints (its own and those of the states), and a changing (in some cases expanding) regulated community. There are, however, some promising signs on the regulatory design horizon as well. 66 Esworthy, How Are They Enforced?, supra note __, at 5, 40 (noting that "how best to measure the success and effectiveness of enforcement" is an issue of continuing interest and that "[f]ully evaluating and measuring the overall effectiveness of current (and past) pollution control enforcement and compliance activities can be quite complicated"). EPA acknowledged this reality recently in a draft strategy for improving oversight of state enforcement performance. U. The salient point about the contextual overview we provide in this Part is that extant and upcoming challenges, as well as emerging opportunities, demonstrate that efforts to improve "regulatory design," even of particular aspects of regulatory regimes such as gatekeeping strategies, should be made with an understanding of the nature of the challenges an agency faces and the tools available to meet those challenges. For example, concerns that a regulatory design that enables private enforcement suits will lead to the problems with private enforcement that Engstrom discusses (overzealousness, coordination challenges, or infidelity to legislative objectives) are likely to be fairly minor in a context in which there is rampant non-compliance, violations are causing significant environmental degradation and harm to public health, and responsible agencies have proved incapable of or unwilling to enforce even the most egregious violations. On the other hand, such concerns are likely to be much more relevant when compliance challenges are complex and require sophisticated, integrated strategies, and a responsible agency's efforts to address these challenges efficiently and effectively are likely to be undermined by the presence of a host of other erstwhile enforcers.
A. Agency Enforcement Records
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), EPA's Inspector General, EPA's Administrator, and EPA's own enforcement office have offered highly critical assessments of EPA's performance in promoting compliance with environmental regulatory requirements. 67 In a December 2012 report, for example, the GAO noted that "[i]n recent years, EPA has reported that it is not achieving all of the environmental and public health benefits it expected in regulating certain entities because of substantial rates of noncompliance in some programs.
68
Compounding the challenge in achieving optimal levels of compliance is the reality that, as the GAO also noted, "because of incomplete or unreliable data on compliance in some programs, such as the NPDES [permit program under the CWA], EPA cannot determine the full extent of entities' compliance." 69 Concerns about government enforcement extend beyond EPA's performance. An essential feature of environmental regulation is its reliance on a cooperative federalism structure. Congress has enacted pollution control laws such as the CAA and CWA, charging EPA with ultimate responsibility for implementing these laws and achieving their goals. It has also empowered qualified and interested states, however, to take over primary implementation, notably planning, permitting, and enforcement, under laws states adopt for that purpose. 70 Over the years, EPA has authorized increasing numbers of states to take primary responsibility for implementation of the major environmental laws, and the states are regarded as the primary 67 For a recent collection of some of the reviews, see Esworthy enforcers under the major federal environmental regulatory statutes. 71 As a result, much of the compliance promotion work is now done by the states with oversight from EPA. According to one account, states conduct about ninety percent of all environmental regulatory inspections and file eighty to ninety percent of environmental enforcement actions. 72 Thus, assessments of the efficacy of state performance are (or to be plausible must be) at the heart of efforts to evaluate government enforcement performance more generally. 73 The GAO and EPA's Office of Inspector General (OIG), among others, have documented significant deficiencies in states' performance. 74 As the GAO noted in 2012, both it and the OIG have reported inconsistencies in state environmental enforcement, and the OIG characterized state enforcement programs as "underperforming," notwithstanding EPA's efforts to improve state performance and oversight consistency. 75 EPA's enforcement office also has acknowledged serious deficiencies in state performance. In its draft August 2013 National Strategy for Improving Oversight of State Enforcement Performance, EPA noted that its reviews of state performance found that "four significant issues in particular continue to be "unresolved and recurring," and to require a focused national effort to address them:
 Widespread and persistent data inaccuracy and incompleteness in national data systems, which make it hard to identify when serious problems exist or to track state actions;  Routine failure of states to identify and report significant noncompliance;  Routine failure of states to take timely or appropriate enforcement actions to return violating facilities to compliance, potentially allowing pollution to continue unabated; and  Failure of states to take appropriate penalty actions, which results in ineffective deterrence for noncompliance and an unlevel playing field for companies that do comply.
The upshot is that, as EPA's OIG has found, "state enforcement programs frequently do not meet national enforcement goals." 77 The Inspector General found that during fiscal years 2003 to 2009, which was before some of the most significant funding declines described below occurred, "performance was low across the board," with some states performing far below average. 78 For example, EPA established a national goal that states inspect 100% of major CAA emitters every two years, but the Inspector General found that only eight states met that goal. As of 2009, EPA set a national goal that states inspect 100% of CWA major permit holders every two years, but in 2010, only two states met that goal, the national average was only 61%, and 13 states inspected fewer than 50% of major facilities. 79 Similarly, only two states met EPA's target for inspections of hazardous waste generators under RCRA, and states averaged inspections at only 62% of the targeted number of facilities. 80 The Inspector General concluded that EPA had failed to hold its regional offices accountable for ensuring that states adequately enforce environmental laws, and that EPA regions did not consistently intervene to correct state deficiencies.
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Given these challenges, as well as growing federal and state budget pressures, EPA observed that it has become increasingly difficult to rely primarily on its traditional approach of inspecting individual entities to increase compliance with the nation's environmental laws and regulations.
82 EPA recently announced a new initiative-Next Generation Compliance-to improve performance by capitalizing on advances in emissions monitoring and information technology.
83
B.
Declining Resources
The adequacy of government resources to promote compliance to optimal levels has been a long-standing concern that seems unlikely to be addressed in the near term. Most of EPA's annual funding comes from discretionary appropriations. The agency's funds increased sharply in the late 1970s, as EPA began implementing many of the foundational environmental laws and noting that EPA has had enormous difficulties in "accurately and consistently tracking the size of the regulated populations"). 77 OIG, Improve Oversight, supra note __, at 8 (Dec. 9, 2011). 78 Id. at 8. 79 Id. at 9. 80 Id. at 10. 81 Id. at 11, 15. Statistics such as the number of enforcement actions brought or the amount of penalty dollars recovered in enforcement actions do not necessarily correlate with either levels of environmental protection achieved or levels of compliance. The need for enforcement action may fall, for example, if earlier steps in the regulatory process have succeeded in making compliance easier and motivating regulated entities to comply. Nevertheless, EPA has acknowledged problems in some states' records on enforcement of the federal statutes and in EPA regional offices' oversight of these programs. See EPA, Improving Oversight, supra note __, at 2-3 ("EPA's current metrics [for state enforcement activity] are based on the activities the states perform and not on the level of compliance within regulated sectors, which is difficult to assess with the information currently available."). 82 GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note __, at 1-2. 83 See Giles, supra note __. The GAO has reviewed this plan and suggested, among other things, that EPA develop a "strategic plan to integrate Next Generation Compliance into its enforcement and compliance program." GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note __, at 8. EPA is in the process of doing so. Id. at 9. adopted earlier that decade. 84 Funding dipped in the early 1980s and then leveled off until late in that decade, after which it increased fairly regularly until fiscal year 2005. The enacted budget for the agency fell slightly for fiscal years 2006 through 2009 (returning to levels experienced during the late 1990s), before reaching a peak of $10.3 billion in fiscal year 2010 and then declining to about $8.5 billion in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, and a little less in fiscal year 2013. 85 Adjusted for inflation, however, EPA's funding in fiscal year 2009 was slightly lower than it was in fiscal year 1978, according to the Congressional Research Service. 86 The impact of a drop in real funding is magnified by the increase in EPA's regulatory responsibilities that occurred between 1978 and 2009 as a result of the enactment of new statutory programs (such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980 87 and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act in 1986 88 ) and the expansion of regulatory programs -often in ways that drew many new sources within the scope of those programs -through amendments to RCRA in 1984, 89 the CWA in 1987, 90 and the CAA in 1990. 91 In each successive fiscal year since 2009, EPA's funds have fallen. 92 Further cuts, perhaps very significant ones, seem almost inevitable, at least in the near term. 93 Environmental group spokespersons have characterized budget cuts for EPA as an indirect way to weaken environmental regulations, likening the situation to "death by a thousand cuts." 94 In comparison with recent budget declines, EPA's staffing has remained relatively constant since fiscal year 1992. EPA's peak workforce occurred in fiscal year 1999 and had declined by 5.5% by fiscal year 2012. 95 EPA's declining resource pool presents it with difficult choices and has led it to consider significant cuts to some programs. 96 The federal government has long provided financial assistance in the form of grants and loans to assist the states in performing their roles under the federal environmental statutes. Between fiscal years 2004 and 2012, annual appropriations for EPA categorical grants to assist states in implementing air, water, pesticide, and hazardous substance programs shrunk by about $85 million. 97 The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) has expressed concern about reductions in federal funding for state environmental programs. 98 The federal government is well aware of these concerns.
The reductions in federal financial support for the states were especially problematic given that many states were cutting funds for their own environmental agencies and enforcement programs at the same time. ECOS concluded in 2009 and 2010 reports that reductions in state budgets for environmental enforcement threatened the viability of state enforcement programs.
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Between fiscal years 2011 and 2012, 24 states reduced funding for their environmental agencies, 101 reflecting "an overall trend of decreasing budgets" for funding for state environmental agencies and, according to ECOS, "jeopardize[ing] states' ability to implement federally delegated programs and policies." 102 The CRS expressed concern about a mismatch between federal support provided and state needs, noting that "[t]he adequacy of federal funds to assist states with these responsibilities has become a more contentious issue over time, as state revenues and spending generally have declined under recent economic conditions." 103 The GAO similarly noted that "the importance of federal grants has increased, as some states have reduced their funding for certain environmental programs to address decreased state revenues and significant deficits in funding." 104 Some states responded to reduced funding for environmental programs by reducing staff levels and cutting outreach and technical assistance programs that can facilitate compliance. 105 State environmental officials have reported to the GAO that resource constraints have required them to institute hiring freezes and reduce staff through attrition and layoffs. In addition, these officials reported that funding freezes or declines have affected their capacity to conduct activities such as permitting, inspections, and monitoring, all of which are critical to effective enforcement. programs that depend on making difficult causal connections between regulated activities and environmental harms; a movement in some contexts away from uniform regulatory treatment toward differentiated responsibility, which may arise under market-based or ambient-based approaches to regulation or other deviations from traditional regulatory tools; and a commitment to target significant violations whether by larger or smaller sources. 107 For various reasons, contemporary government enforcement officials would face significant challenges in achieving effective enforcement of environmental laws even if the financial resources available for enforcement were not declining. In some instances, the size of the regulated community has grown. 108 EPA has referred to the "breadth and expanding scope of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) regulated universe" as one of the challenges it faces in improving its enforcement performance. 109 The number of point sources subject to CWA permitting requirements doubled over a recent ten-year period. 110 A recent appellate court decision established, for example, that pesticide applications that allow chemical residues to enter surface water bodies may trigger regulation under that statute. 111 Stormwater permitting has also increased the size of the regulated community. 112 The resulting increase in permittees may present difficulties for federal and state regulators. 113 In New York, regulated point sources increased by 63% between 1999 and 2012. 114 In some of these contexts, it may be possible to reduce the burdens of regulating these sources through the creation of general permits, such as the ones available under both the CWA's dredge and fill 115 and NPDES 116 permit programs. Indeed, EPA has developed a general permit for pesticide and herbicide applications over surface waters. 117 General permits undoubtedly reduce the resource commitment a state must make at the permit approval stage, but agencies continue to have at least some ongoing responsibility for monitoring, oversight of reporting, and inspections. 118 If agencies seek to reduce their administrative burdens by not only switching from source-specific to general permitting, but also by minimizing oversight of sources covered by general permits through reduced inspections or sporadic review of regulated entities' reports, one trade-off will be a decline in verifiability and accountability.
Efforts to enforce against private landowners, small businesses, or sectors of the business community (such as agriculture) that traditionally have not been enforcement targets also may pose new challenges, such as increased political opposition. Efforts to enforce wetlands permitting requirements under the CWA, for example, have generated intense political opposition and adverse publicity for the federal government.
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Changes in the nature of regulatory approaches also may exacerbate efforts to induce optimal levels of compliance. In recent years, for example, EPA has begun to shift its focus in implementing the CWA from enforcement of technology-based effluent limitations applicable to point sources to achieving state water quality standards through the implementation of ambient quality-based effluent limitations. 120 Water quality standards are often expressed in terms of maximum ambient concentrations of pollutants in a surface water body. Implementation of such a standard requires a state environmental agency to establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL), which is an aggregate amount of pollution that may be discharged into a surface water body without resulting in concentrations of regulated pollutants in excess of those allowed by a state water quality standard. 121 Establishing enforceable limits, monitoring whether allowed loadings (clearly enforceable or less so) are producing desired environmental results, and adapting to the findings are all resource-intensive enterprises. 122 Determining whether a point source violated technology-based effluent limits, which are expressed as caps on end-of-pipe of Endangered Species Status for Six West Texas Aquatic Invertebrates, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,228 (July 9, 2013) (describing Texas general permit program). 118 See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,775 (listing among the Pesticide General Permit requirements the duties of applicators to monitor adverse incidents and document visual monitoring activities). General permits under the NPDES permit program may regulate one or more categories of discharges, provided that all sources within a category are subject to the same or similar monitoring requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(ii)(D). 119 (2012), a case concerning CWA enforcement action to block construction of a single family home on property alleged to contain regulated wetlands, as an example of the view of libertarians and tea party members that EPA is the "embodiment of government run amok"). 120 See, e.g., GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note ___, at 614 (noting recent increase in the role of water quality standards and likely greater future reliance on those standards). 121 Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 14 n.8 (1 st Cir. 2012) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C)) ("A TMDL is a calculation of the maximum quantity of a pollutant that may be added to a water body from all sources without exceeding applicable water quality standards including 'a margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water quality'"). 122 It is difficult to overstate the complexity associated with the regulatory and non-regulatory enterprise of seeking to bring an impaired water up to a desired state. Cf. Sarah Birkeland, EPA's TMDL Program, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 297, 300 (2001) (referring to "the implementation and enforcement challenges faced by the EPA's TMDL program"). discharges, is a relatively simple matter by comparison. Agency efforts to improve water quality by restoring and maintaining ecologically functioning ecosystems will likely create similar ripple effects on enforcement strategies. 123 As regulatory challenges change, so do enforcement challenges, affecting optimal regulatory design of enforcement regimes, including agency gatekeeping of private enforcement.
Shifting from traditional regulatory techniques such as technology-based limits that apply to classes of regulated sources to market-based strategies that allow individual regulated entities to alter their responsibilities through inter-source transactions is another change in regulatory approach that is likely to create new enforcement challenges.
124 Such a shift may make it more difficult to ascertain the nature and extent of enforceable duties of individual regulated entities. 125 Some emissions trading markets have been exploited through the sale of credits for environmental improvements that would have occurred even without regulation, credits for which sellers have already been fully paid either in the same or another market, or credits that did not occur at all except on paper. 126 Colorado noted that the burden on agencies to improve compliance may increase when requirements are tailored rather than consistent across an industry, not only because it will be more difficult for government inspectors to determine compliance, but also because "it may be more difficult to implement a self-certification program where individualized permits determine unique facility-specific compliance requirements." 127 A final development that may increase the difficulty of enforcement for public and private enforcers is the effort to address significant environmental threats, even from sources that have not traditionally been the focus of agency enforcement attention, and to address sources that are emitting or discharging relatively small amounts, but whose violations may be cumulatively significant. 128 If enforcement initiatives target smaller sources, enforcers may have to initiate more actions and commit more resources to enforcement just to achieve the same level of environmental improvement through enhanced compliance. 129 In addition, data relevant to compliance status may not be available to the same extent for small as for larger sources, making it more difficult to enforce against those sources, or at least more expensive as agencies must amass a data base that does not exist or is incomplete. 130 Changes in regulatory challenges are not entirely in the direction of making government officials' jobs more difficult. There are also opportunities to promote compliance that may facilitate better performance. As Part III below indicates, these include improvements in monitoring capacity and enhancements in the capacity to manage and disseminate data and other information. Improved understanding of the mix of incentives that promote compliance also holds promise for improving the effectiveness of enforcement efforts. 131 
D.
A Brief Conclusion Concerning the Importance of Context to Regulatory Design Professor Engstrom's analysis focuses on rationalization and optimization of enforcement through coordination of private and public enforcement litigation. He identifies three kinds of problems posed by a regime that relies in part on private enforcement -what he refers to as zealousness, 132 coordination, 133 and democratic accountability challenges. 134 He then asks whether vesting agencies with "gatekeeping" powers over private enforcement is a more promising approach to rationalizing public and private enforcement than litigation reforms of the kind that have been suggested or adopted in recent years. Legislation or judicial decisions that expand or narrow the circumstances in which prevailing parties in federal court litigation may recover attorneys' fees 135 or that impose more rigorous pleading requirements on litigants certainly may affect the willingness of private litigants to bring enforcement actions. It is appropriate and important to compare the relative merits of these kinds of reforms and agency gatekeeping mechanisms of the kind Professor Engstrom analyzes, as Engstrom does.
In crafting an approach to rationalizing public and private enforcement, however, policymakers and students of the environmental regulatory process should be aware that developments throughout that process also significantly impact both public and private enforcement efforts, and therefore affect the value of a gatekeeping approach to addressing the critiques of private enforcement. As Part I above indicates, regulatory design efforts will benefit from understanding the relationships among five key characteristics of regulation, even in circumstances in which such efforts focus on a particular aspect of regulation, such as agency gatekeeping of private enforcement. Part II demonstrates that policymakers engaged in regulatory design also should consider a different set of contextual realities: the actual record of the agency involved, its capacity to fulfill statutory duties, and the dynamic character of the challenges facing agencies and the opportunities available to them in addressing those challenges. The overarching point is that regulatory design, even of public gatekeeping mechanisms for private enforcement, needs to be undertaken with a sophisticated understanding of the nature of the compliance promotion landscape that exists in a particular regulatory setting and of the changes in this landscape that are likely to occur over time. In this Part we return full circle to Professor Engstrom's original claim -that rationalization of the increasing volume of private enforcement litigation with government enforcement poses a central challenge in the modern regulatory state. We do so by exploring what degree of importance EPA seems to have attached to this challenge as it grapples with how best to reinvent its compliance promotion strategies under the CWA. It is not our objective to empirically evaluate Professor Engstrom's claim or to refute the relevance of the interplay between public and private enforcers to efforts to promote effective regulation. Instead, we simply seek to explore the extent to which one of the agencies on which Engstrom focuses, EPA, shares his perspective. As the description of EPA's recent compliance promotion efforts in this Part indicates, EPA does not appear to regard rationalization of public and private enforcement as either the essential challenge facing its compliance promotion efforts or as a priority to fostering increased compliance in the future. The agency's analysis of this feature of regulatory design is conspicuous by its absence. Rather, EPA's CWA strategies provide examples that support our claim that regulatory design in general, and design of compliance promotion mechanisms in particular, turn on a series of factors that reflect the multi-faceted, hybrid, and dynamic character of the regulatory process. 143 OECA also emphasized the challenge presented by a substantially increased universe of regulated parties: "[t]he sheer magnitude of the expanding universe of the NPDES program itself, from roughly 100,000 . . . sources to nearly a million sources . . . presents challenges in how we regulate and enforce the laws. . . ."
144 EPA noted that the types of sources known to raise concerns has evolved as well: when EPA developed its enforcement policies, it focused primarily on the largest (or major) facilities with individual permits that are in significant noncompliance, but it found a rate of serious noncompliance at about 45 percent of smaller facilities. 145 According to the CWAP, "[w]ithout complete and accurate data, it is hard to know how critical the noncompliance at smaller facilities is to water quality. It is likely that these smaller but more numerous sources are of critical concern, especially where there are 138 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) . 139 Concerns pre-dated this latest EPA call for improvements. See Markell, Deterrence-Based Enforcement, supra note __; RECHTSHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note __. Generally, the CWA requires thousands of entities across the country to obtain individual or general permits that allow them to discharge water pollution. Compliance-related efforts have focused on optimizing compliance with these permit requirements. One of the primary strategies EPA has used is enforcement litigation against parties operating in "significant non-compliance" with permit obligations. 140 Memorandum from Administrator Jackson on Improving Water Quality Transparency and Effective Enforcement of Clean Water Act Requirements (July 2, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/performance/cwa/jackson-ltr-cwa-enf.html. See also CWAP, supra note __, at 2 ("Unfortunately, data shows us that we are not getting the compliance envisioned by our laws to protect clean water."); id. at 3 ("State enforcement response to serious violations, whether at large or smaller facilities, is not what it should be."). The memo adds that: 1) traditionally EPA has focused more on large, "major" facilities than others; 2) it has not even required states to submit data about smaller facilities to EPA; and 3) therefore, that whereas EPA does not know the percentage of smaller sources nationally that are in significant compliance, compared to the rate for major facilities. But for the 28 states, 4 territories, and D.C., which have provided some of these data, the rate of significant noncompliance at smaller facilities is around 45 percent, nearly twice the rate for major facilities. The Plan concludes that "EPA and states need consistent, national data to be able to formulate appropriate strategies for ensuring compliance from these facilities, and to target enforcement resources to the sources most affecting water quality." Id. at 3. 141 Memorandum from Administrator Jackson, supra note ___. 142 CWAP, supra note __. 143 Id. at Executive Summary. 144 Id. at 1, 12 (noting that EPA's CWA-based permitting and enforcement program has "expanded its regulated universe more than tenfold"). 145 Id. at 3.
clusters of permitted facilities around impaired waters."
146 OECA stated that EPA needed to "revamp" enforcement to meet these challenges. 147 Based on its own assessment, and considerable outreach, 148 OECA identified "three major themes for action" to improve compliance, noting that its outreach efforts engendered a "surprising coalescence" around these themes. 149 The three themes, discussed below, are the need to focus on the most significant threats, to strengthen EPA-state partnerships and improve the performance of each partner, and to improve accountability and transparency.
A.
The Need to Focus Enforcement on the Most Significant Threats
The first theme for action identified in the CWAP is the need to focus enforcement on the "biggest threats to water quality and public health." 150 This strategy (or approach to regulatory design) might seem obvious. But as EPA points out, an unintended consequence of EPA's traditional regulatory design, which was to focus on the biggest facilities (known in EPA parlance as "majors") was that EPA paid little attention to the "full range of the NPDES regulated universe,"
151 including "non-major" sources whose discharges caused significant environmental problems.
EPA identified a range of "new approaches and new tools" to address its proposed shift in enforcement strategy. 152 For example, EPA noted its need to improve its data management in order to be able to understand the relationship between compliance problems and their impacts 146 Id. Professor Dick Pierce recognized decades ago that "[s]mall firms do not produce disproportionate quantities of social 'goods.' They do produce massively disproportionate quantities of social 'bads.'" Richard J. Pierce, Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 539 (1986). See also id. at 557 ("small firms account for a disproportionate quantity of the social bads that we attempt to reduce through regulation."); id. at 559 ("Small firms also are responsible for a massively disproportionate share of water and air pollution."). Professor Pierce was addressing small firms, not necessarily small facilities, but EPA's assessment in the CWAP indicates that similar conclusions may apply to small sources, especially when assessing the aggregate impacts of their discharges. 147 Id. at Executive Summary, 5. EPA noted that some water quality problems are caused by sources not currently being regulated. Id. at 6. Our focus, like Prof. Engstrom's, is on optimal regulatory design in the compliance arena; we do not address the need to revisit the scope of underlying regulatory schemes (such as by covering nonpoint sources currently exempt from most CWA regulation). 148 Outreach included solicitation of input from academics, industry, and environmental and environmental justice NGOs, among others. Id. at 5. 149 Id. at 6. Since issuing its Plan in 2009, EPA has followed through in various ways. Second, EPA highlighted the importance of improving tools across the spectrum of regulation, indicating that while responses might include enforcement actions, addressing water quality concerns also might require fixing problematic regulations and improving operating permits. 155 Third, the agency focused on integrating its "state partners" better in its discussion about options for addressing the "biggest threats."
156
In short, EPA's strategy in addressing the first significant deficiency it identified in extant compliance promotion efforts involved several of the key elements of a conceptual framework for regulatory design that we introduced in the introduction to this Essay. First, EPA's strategy acknowledged the inter-related character of the regulatory process and the need to consider actions, including improvements in its regulations, the operation of the CWA's permitting regime, and its management of data throughout the process to improve compliance (our first characteristic). Second, EPA's goal of better integrating states into its enforcement initiatives reflects the hybrid nature of the regulatory process. Third, the agency's decision to refocus its efforts was based on the "reality check" that historically it was giving insufficient attention to significant violators by focusing on a small subset of the regulated party universe. Fourth, EPA's commitment to take advantage of improved technology to make "timely, easily accessible and understandable information available to the public concerning violations/violators, actions EPA and states are taking to address them, and the effects of our actions on water quality" 157 relates to our first characteristic (inter-relatedness) and our fourth (dynamism).
B.
Strengthening the State/EPA Partnership and the Performance of Each
The second "major theme for action" that EPA identified in its CWAP, not entirely distinct from the first, is the need to strengthen the performance of the states, the key implementers of the CWA. States play an indispensable implementation role within cooperative federalism systems, the governance model (regulatory design) Congress adopted in the major environmental laws. 158 The Plan notes that reviews of state performance have identified widespread deficiencies, and EPA has identified the importance of federal oversight to motivate improvements in such performance: 153 Id. (noting that "[o]nce we have identified significant point source violations across the spectrum of regulated facilities that adversely affect water quality, we will work with state programs to commence appropriate federal and state civil and criminal enforcement actions.") 154 Id. 155 Id. 156 Id. For example, OECA has recently indicated that it is receptive to allowing states to scale back inspections and monitoring at large facilities to free up resources for more intensive scrutiny at smaller facilities, at which compliance rates are lower. Reflecting the complexity of the cooperative federalism approach, however, another recent report indicates that while states are ready to refocus their efforts, some of EPA's regional offices have expressed less willingness to go along with shifting enforcement-related resources from large facilities to higher priority smaller ones. [The many reviews of state permitting and enforcement performance] have identified a lack of consistency in performance across states and highlighted common issues such as permit backlogs, failure to identify significant noncompliance, or to take timely and appropriate enforcement. EPA must consistently respond to these issues and press states and ourselves to make the appropriate improvements in order to achieve equitable protection to the public, a level playing field for competing businesses, and fairness across states in how our environmental laws are enforced. 159 This EPA priority is consistent with Professor Engstrom's insight that "rationalization" of the work and responsibilities of different actors is a central challenge of governance, but EPA's focus is on a different piece of the hybrid governance conundrum, and it is consistent with our point (the second of our key conceptual elements of regulatory design) that design efforts must be cognizant of the roles of all stakeholders in a hybrid regulatory process. Particularly in the cooperative federalism context built into the environmental statutes, it is unsurprising that EPA would make rationalization of its relationship with the states a top priority. 160 As we have pointed out elsewhere, 161 EPA exercises ex ante gatekeeping and ex post oversight of state enforcement and one of its long-standing challenges is to rationalize its relationship with the states. The availability of citizen suits complicates this rationalization challenge because such suits make it possible for three enforcers with different interests and capacities to be concerned about particular alleged violators. EPA, in short, ideally will consider private party, state, and federal capacities and pathologies in pursuing rationalization of the enforcement action among all three sets of actors. Professor Engstrom builds on past work addressing pieces of this challenge. 162 Hybrid governance challenges and opportunities need to be addressed through better integration of state actors as well as NGOs throughout the regulatory process.
EPA's focus in the CWAP on rationalizing federal and state enforcement efforts reflects not only our point about the importance of hybrid governance considerations to regulatory design, but other conceptual elements as well. EPA's identification of deficiencies in state performance at different stages of the regulatory process relates to our first element (the interrelationship of the different phases of the regulatory process). The agency's apparent decision to regard rationalization of federal and state enforcement as a higher priority than the rationalization of public and private enforcement that is the subject of Professor Engstrom's analysis relates to our fifth element (salience). 163 To the extent that EPA regards past state enforcement efforts as ineffective, the second element of its CWAP strategy also implicates our "reality check" feature. Thus, EPA's goal of strengthening state performance bears on at least four of the elements of our conceptual framework for improving regulatory design.
C.
Improving Accountability and Transparency
The third theme around which EPA and its stakeholders coalesced in the CWAP is the need to improve accountability and transparency. 164 Related to the prior two themes, EPA acknowledged that it "lacks nationally consistent and complete information on the facilities, permits, pollutant discharges and compliance status of most NPDES-regulated facilities." 165 Data problems exist across the board, including "data quality, accuracy, and completeness." 166 Inevitably, the infrastructure problem these data gaps represent "affects the ability of EPA and states to identify violations . . . , connect violations to water quality impacts, and to share information with the public." 167 The Plan notes that the "breadth and expanding scope of the NPDES regulated universe" heightens the challenge of responding to the long-standing data problems. 168 The CWAP indicates that, because of the size of the challenge and the costs involved (it would cost over $100 million/year to generate the data EPA would like to have), EPA will explore new ways to fill these data gaps, including using technological advances. 169 Innovative information-gathering technologies may facilitate the ability of regulators and potential private enforcers to identify regulatory violations. Geographic information systems, global positioning satellite technologies, and remote sensing devices already support the investigation and enforcement of environmental laws in ways that were not previously possible. 170 Some of this technology is available to the public at little or no cost from the U.S. Geological Survey or state governments. Data such as aerial photography that can help identify past environmental conditions, violations, and violators may not be available elsewhere. 171 As
Professor Dan Esty has noted, "[t]echnological advances in data collection, analysis, and dissemination have the potential to revolutionize our response to environmental problems." 172 Thus, for example:
Breakthroughs in nanotechnologies and small-scale sensors . . . have begun to provide a vastly improved ability to detect and measure pollutants at a fine-grained level. Similarly, remote sensing from satellites in space and other new macroscale sensor technologies appear poised to provide on-the-ground monitoring of environmental conditions from anywhere, at any time, at increasingly low cost. We thus are approaching the day when virtually all emissions will be susceptible to tagging, tracking, and measurement at relatively low cost.
Air emissions already are being tracked with a degree of sophistication that was unimaginable just a few years ago. Gaussian plume analysis now permits regulators to plot the drift of air pollutants with increasing precision. Advances in meteorological modeling have further enhanced our ability to understand the sources and "receptors" of air pollution. Similar gains are being made in tracing pollutants as they flow through watersheds and hydrological systems. 173 Esty adds that, "[s]imply put, these gains in data management, analysis, and retrieval make possible a more empirical and quantitative approach to environmental protection." 174 These data can facilitate efforts to induce higher compliance levels by motivating regulated parties to comply without the need for enforcement action and by strengthening deterrence by providing information that facilitates proof that violations have occurred. 175 The dynamic nature of changes in information technology means that the economics, feasibility, and chances for success of enforcement will not remain static, likely resulting in a shift in the balance of public and private enforcement over time. As monitoring technology improves, for example, it may become cheaper for NGOs to acquire the data they need to support private enforcement actions. Professor Engstrom regards as "overblown and indeterminate" the zealousness critique of private enforcement, which identifies as costs of private enforcement overexpenditure of social resources and costly overdeterrence. 176 If this critique is at all accurate, however, improvements in monitoring technology may exacerbate the "overzealousness" of private enforcement by reducing the costs of the fact-gathering needed to support allegations of noncompliance.
Similarly, improvements in monitoring technology also may affect gatekeeping design decisions animated by the legislative fidelity critique of private enforcement that Professor Engstrom references, which is based on the political accountability of public but not private enforcers. The lack of accountability of private enforcers creates a risk of legislative drift if private enforcers "develop and press novel applications of legal mandates that public enforcers, exercising sound prosecutorial discretion, would forgo as inconsistent with original legislative intent. Relentless pursuit of profit thus yields a form of statutory drift and mission creep as private enforcers drive law enforcement efforts in new and democratically unaccountable directions." 177 One counter to this argument, noted by Engstrom, is that Congress took into account and implicitly endorsed this kind of "zealous" enforcement by private litigants when it created citizen suit provisions, thereby "conferring democratic legitimacy, though at a higher level of generality," on such enforcement pursuits. 178 To the extent that the legislative drift critique has any cogency, however, changes in the nature of monitoring technology, and therefore in the implementation of environmental statutes, can spur suits that would not otherwise have been brought, adding to the chances that regulatory policy will be set in the context of private litigation in ways which Congress or the agency deem unwise. 179 Another possible result of better monitoring information that may affect gatekeeping design considerations involves the possibility that improvements in monitoring data (to the extent they increase the chance of successful prosecution or reduce the cost of pursuing cases) may induce government to initiate enforcement action in marginal cases in which it previously would not have been cost-justified. This might reduce the need for private enforcement. Similarly, better monitoring information may motivate regulated parties not to violate the law in the first place, thereby influencing the universe of cases that deserve formal enforcement, an important consideration in gatekeeping regime design.
Invoking the experience with the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, the CWAP touts the promise of transparency as a tool to improve compliance. 180 EPA suggests that public pressure and greater regulated party self-awareness can both motivate better performance. For our purposes, the key point is that, in identifying strategies to improve compliance, EPA is looking well beyond ex post enforcement and considering a range of tools throughout the regulatory process (our first characteristic). In doing so, it is by no means dismissing the value of traditional enforcement; it is simply calling for use of additional tools to address compliance challenges, a position we have taken in previous work 181 and which academic literatures support. 182 According to EPA, "[t]ransparency is not a replacement for regulatory enforcement, but can be an effective driver for improved performance and accountability." 183 This third significant theme of EPA's reinvention effort reflects EPA's view that rationalization (to use Professor Engstrom's term) of ex post enforcement by public and private actors is only part of the answer to altering sub-optimal regulatory design to enhance compliance. The CWAP's third theme also illustrates how considerations relating to hybrid governance and the dynamic nature of the regulatory environment can affect regulatory design choices, and that these aspects of regulatory design may affect key characteristics of effective regulation, including implementability, verifiability, the creation of appropriate compliance incentives, and regulatory legitimacy. The point is that optimal regulatory design of gatekeeping structures will shift over time as technology advances, government capacity evolves in other ways, 184 and more is learned about what works and what doesn't to motivate regulated party compliance. Decisions about the design of such structures should be made with the dynamic character of optimality in mind.
IV. Conclusion
In Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, Professor David Engstrom tackles the challenge of regulatory design across the agency landscape with a particular focus on the rationalization of regulatory enforcement by government and private enforcers. Engstrom, appropriately in our view, suggests that enforcement is not likely to be either entirely public or private; instead, the design challenge is to consider how best to rationalize enforcement actions by both sets of actors. Further, he suggests that in addition to using litigation rules to achieve an optimal form of rationalization it is possible to design agency gatekeeping of private enforcement to advance this goal. Engstrom offers a continuum of government gatekeeping design options from more to less interventionist.
Our purpose in this Essay is to highlight the importance that context plays in regulatory design, and based on EPA's experience, to suggest our own five-part conceptual framework for how to approach optimal regulatory design. First, efforts to advance optimal regulatory design need to consider the fundamentally inter-related character of the regulatory process. We offer a taxonomy of the regulatory process that highlights key features of that process and provide illustrations of the types of interconnections that require attention as part of optimal regulatory inaccurate reporting by regulated entities, and charging that EPA and most states "make no effort to verify the [reported] data"). 181 182 See, e.g., GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note _; NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE, supra note ___. 183 CWAP, supra note ___, at 10. 184 See Grabowsky, supra note 65. design efforts. 185 Second, efforts to achieve optimal regulatory design should be mindful of the hybrid character of contemporary governance. Even if the goal is to rationalize agency gatekeeping of private enforcement, design should take into account how best to engage all stakeholders in different stages of the regulatory process, not just public officials and NGO litigants during the ex post stage of enforcement litigation. Third, we suggest that optimal regulatory design, whether of agency gatekeeping of private enforcement or otherwise, requires what we term a "reality check" contextual feature. It is critical to assess the agency's (here EPA's) actual performance in conducting enforcement, the challenges it faces, and available opportunities to improve performance. Fourth, we suggest regulatory designers must consider the degree of dynamism -the likelihood that capabilities and interests of different key actors throughout the entire regulatory enterprise will change over time in ways that impact the effectiveness of regulation. Finally, we suggest that in a world of limited resources regulatory designers should consider the salience of revisiting the design of particular phases of the regulatory process and prioritize efforts to redesign regulatory components accordingly.
We also provide a set of gauges for effective regulation that may be useful in assessing regulatory design options that emerge from this interconnected framework, including clarity, workability, verifiability, the creation of appropriate incentives for regulated entities, and legitimacy. Finally, in response to Professor Engstrom's call for greater rationalization of public and private enforcement, we broaden the focus to regulatory design of optimal compliance structures generally, including but not limited to integration of public and private enforcement, by sketching out the compliance challenges currently facing EPA and EPA's attempt to address these challenges by engaging in efforts to enhance compliance under a key environmental statute, the CWA. Our discussion of these challenges and potential solutions illustrates the value of taking the multi-faceted approach to regulatory design we recommend and the potential our approach has for more effectively fostering statutory compliance.
At its heart, a strong pragmatic orientation grounds this Essay. We have developed what we hope is a conceptual framework for improving regulatory design that offers a somewhat different, yet complementary lens for thinking about regulatory design than the approach by Professor Engstrom that has prompted our assessment.
